o Today it is obvious that not instigated organizational reform was under a no other content except large-scale reduction of the officer corps and the maximum "compression" of the existing structure of the Armed Forces to the size, allowing more less effectively within the allocated budget.
o What is the Army that existed before the 2008 division reformed into brigades, minimize and control all available raskassirovav battalions and regiments to divisions, at the same time reducing to zero all the full mobilization structure.
o The "reformers" did not even try to somehow work experimentally suggestions. First, all the Armed Forces have been thrown under the steamroller of total reform on which left tens of billions of dollars, and then, when the old army was dismantled, new teams were formed, "reformers", finally took up the study of the combat capabilities of what they did.
o And here they waited a very unpleasant discovery . It turned out that the "optimized" for its brigade combat capability does not even reach the old regiments of the state. Hung with all sorts of weapons, advertised as the "newest" and "unique", they are all in the past exercises with sad regularity show unacceptably low its combat capability. Never in the course of the exercise higher headquarters and numerous advisers and the inspection and failed to achieve consistent self vigorous action Motorised Brigade of the new sample.
o If the first stage - advance and deployment still somehow manage it turns out, that as the complexity of the tactical situation and income introductory management team as a single combat brigade command mechanism is lost and starts rambling impulsive movement of troops.
o How sad joked one of the generals of Army Staff: actions on the teachings of the new teams are very good for learning academies unsuccessful actions of Soviet mechanized corps in the early days of the war . Set of chaotic motion, constant lag, loss of control and as a consequence -the conduct of hostilities hastily put together summary battle groups.
reasons are many .
o First , in the brigades, compared with shelves, dramatically reduced the number of officers. If the shelf for 2000 were 250 soldiers and 150 officers, warrant officers, the new team on 4000 327 officers soldiers.
o Reduce the officers and respectively -became weaker governance. Officers simply can not cope with the command. Especially at the brigade headquarters. Combat control team just not capable of handling such a bloated structure. In addition, layoffs officers with combat experience and years of service, have led to a sharp decrease in the already not very high level of training of today`s officers.
o As evidence we can quote from an interview with the commander of a motorized infantry regiment 693 Andrey Kozachenko, who in August 2008 first entered South Ossetia:
"Reforms should have been held. I completely agree here. Another question is how to carry them out? For example, I would say from my point of view, by the commander. What`s the difference who command -a regiment or brigade. On the contrary, the regiment -it`s not as cumbersome organization, which is for the brigade. Here in my regiment had 48 officers and warrant officers of the regiment control. This is 2200 people. And now in the brigade, where 3500-4000 people -33 people. What kind of optimization we talking about? Do we have officers have changed, or they have become gold? Or they immediately become all professionals? As it was, and remains .... "
o Second , the brigade received a "blind" -available in the brigade reconnaissance units do not provide a full exploration in the band of her actions. Their forces and equipment strictly enough. A reconnaissance battalions are not able to provide valuable intelligence in the operations zone battalions and scanty "reconnaissance battalion" team is not able to not only provide them with effective assistance, but just needed to conduct reconnaissance in the interests of team depth.
o And even the information obtained can not be processed in a timely manner and brought to the brigade command, as in the management team does not provide any intelligence and information structure, neither the department nor even offices that could analyze incoming information, check it out, organize and bring to a commander.
o All intelligence in command and control teams represented only intelligence chief, instructor and civil foreman translator. All!
o This command does not allow teams to exercise even getting enough to properly assess the amount of information of the enemy, as a consequence -not allow it properly assessed and accordingly develop the right solution to fight.
o And it is during combat operations against potential enemy, technologically equal to the level of our army. What can we say about the conduct of the battle against similar pieces technologically advanced armies? The possibility of their reconnaissance, targeting and combat employment opportunities superior stubby "brigades new look" on the order!
o To understand the weakness and failure of the resulting structure, you just need to put a number similar to the U.S. or NATO brigade, which, in fact, be "counterbalanced" by our teams and compare their capabilities. But not by the number of trunks or goals that have long ceased to reflect the actual combat capability of modern troops, and combat capabilities :
-The depth and density of intelligence,
-Speed and precision targeting,
-Communication and command and control.
o Besides the problems with the combat capability of the new brigades, thawed is one more group of acute problems - "weight" logistics . Copying with the U.S. Army Brigadier principle "reformers" and somehow forgot to copy the American system of logistics. Namely, it makes "brigade" organization operating in the U.S. Army. According to her logistics brigades carried the division in which these organizational teams included. Themselves brigade -the structures which are concentrated only on the conduct of hostilities.
o We have the same with the elimination of all divisions were rear hinged on the same team. As a result, as aptly described the resulting monster chairman of the board of military experts Maj. Gen. Vladimirov, combat brigades instead we get a "ugly bloated shelves" . Who completely lost mobility and unitarity regiments, but power division has not lasted.
/V.Shurygin "BIG BIG LIE OR REFORM?", zavtra.ru/Continued
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